We prove a new minimax theorem connecting the worst-case Bayesian regret and minimax regret under partial monitoring with no assumptions on the space of signals or decisions of the adversary. We then generalise the information-theoretic tools of Russo and Van Roy (2016) for proving Bayesian regret bounds and combine them with the minimax theorem to derive minimax regret bounds for various partial monitoring settings. The highlight is a clean analysis of 'non-degenerate easy' and 'hard' finite partial monitoring, with new regret bounds that are independent of arbitrarily large game-dependent constants. The power of the generalised machinery is further demonstrated by proving that the minimax regret for k-armed adversarial bandits is at most √ 2kn, improving on existing results by a factor of 2. Finally, we provide a simple analysis of the cops and robbers game, also improving best known constants.
Introduction
Partial monitoring is a generalisation of the multi-armed bandit framework with an interestingly richer structure. In this paper we are concerned with the finite-action version. Let k be the number of actions. A finite-action partial monitoring game is described by two functions, the loss function L : [k] × X → [0, 1] and a signal function Φ : [k] × X → Σ, where [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k} and X and Σ are topological spaces. At the start of the game the adversary secretly chooses a sequence of outcomes (x t ) n t=1 with x t ∈ X , where n is the horizon. The learner knows L, Φ and n and sequentially chooses actions (A t ) n t=1 from [k] . In round t, after the learner chooses A t they suffer a loss of L(A t , x t ) and observe only Φ(A t , x t ) as a way of indirectly learning about the loss. A policy π is a function mapping action/signal sequences to probability distributions over actions (the learner is allowed to randomise) and the regret of policy π in environment x = (x t ) n t=1 is R n (π, x) = min
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in the learner's choices which follow π. The minimax regret of a partial monitoring game is R * n = inf π∈Π sup x∈X n R n (π, x) , arXiv:1902.00470v1 [cs.
LG] 1 Feb 2019
where Π is the space of all policies. Our objective is to understand how the minimax regret depends on the horizon n and the structure of L and Φ. Some classical examples of partial monitoring games are given in Table 1 Bayesian viewpoint Although our primary objective is to shed light on the minimax adversarial regret, we establish our results by first proving uniform bounds on the Bayesian regret that hold for any prior. Then a new minimax theorem demonstrates the existence of an algorithm with the same minimax regret. While these methods are not constructive, we demonstrate that they lead to elegant analysis of various partial monitoring problems, and better control of the constants in the bounds. Let Q be a space of probability measures on X n with the Borel σ-algebra. The Bayesian regret of a policy π with respect to prior ν ∈ Q is BR n (π, ν) = X n R n (π, x)dν(x) .
The minimax Bayesian optimal regret is BR * n (Q) = sup
where Π M is a space of policies so that x → R n (π, x) is measurable, which we define formally in Section 3. When Q is clear from the context, we write BR * n in place of BR * n (Q). Contributions Our first contribution is to generalise the machinery developed by Russo and Van Roy (2016) ; Russo and Roy (2017) and Bubeck et al. (2015) . In particular, we prove a minimax theorem for finite-action partial monitoring games with no restriction on either the loss or the feedback function. The theorem establishes that the Bayesian optimal regret and minimax regret are equal: BR * n = R * n . Next, the information-theoretic machinery of Russo and Roy (2017) is generalised by replacing the mutual information with an expected Bregman divergence. The power of the generalisation is demonstrated by showing that R * n ≤ √ 2kn for k-armed adversarial bandits, which improves on the best known bounds by a factor of 2. The rest of the paper is focussed on applying these ideas to finite partial monitoring games. The results enormously simplify existing analysis by sidestepping the complex localisation arguments. At the same time, our bounds for the class of 'easy non-degenerate' games do not depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, which was true of all prior analysis. Finally, for a special class of bandits with graph feedback called cops and robbers, we show that R * n ≤ 2n log(k), improving on prior work by a factor of 5/ √ 2.
Related work
Since partial monitoring is so generic, the related literature is vast, with most work focussing on the full information setting (see ) or the bandit setting ; ). The information-theoretic machinery that we build on was introduced by Russo and Van Roy (2016); Russo and Roy (2017) in the context of minimizing the Bayesian regret for stationary stochastic bandits (with varying structural assumptions). Bubeck et al. (2015) noticed the results also applied to the 'adversarial' Bayesian setting and applied minimax theory to prove worst-case bounds for convex bandits. Minimax theory has also been used to transfer Bayesian regret bounds to adversarial bounds. For example, Abernethy et al. (2009) explores this in the context of online convex optimisation in the full-information setting and Gravin et al. (2016) for prediction with expert advice. The finite version of partial monitoring was introduced by Rustichini (1999) , who developed Hannan consistent algorithms. The main challenge since then has been characterizing the dependence of the regret on the horizon in terms of the structure of the loss and signal functions. It is now known that all games can be classified into one of exactly four types. Trivial and hopeless, for which R * n = 0 and R * n = Ω(n) respectively. Between these extremes there are 'easy' games where R * n = Θ(n 1/2 ) and 'hard' games for which R * n = Θ(n 2/3 ). The classification result is proven by piecing together upper and lower bounds from various papers Foster and Rakhlin, 2012; Antos et al., 2013; . A caveat of the classification theorem is that the focus is entirely on the dependence of the minimax regret on the horizon. The leading constant is gamedependent and poorly understood. Existing bounds for easy games depend on a constant that can be arbitrarily large, even for fixed d and k. One of the contributions of this paper is to resolve this issue. Another disadvantage of the current partial monitoring literature, especially in the adversarial setting, is that the algorithms and analysis tend to be rather complicated. Although our results only prove the existence of an algorithm witnessing a claimed minimax bound, the Bayesian algorithm and analysis are intuitive and natural. There is also a literature on stochastic partial monitoring, with early analysis by Bartók et al. (2011) . A quite practical algorithm was proposed by Vanchinathan et al. (2014) . The asymptotics have also been worked out (Komiyama et al., 2015) . Although a frequentist regret bound in a stochastic setting normally implies a Bayesian regret bound, in our Bayesian setup the environments are not stationary, while all the algorithms for the stochastic case rely heavily that the distribution of the adversary is stationary. Generalising these algorithms to the non-stationary case does not seem straightforward. Finally, we should mention there is an alternative definition of the regret that is less harsh on the learner. For trivial, easy and hard games it is the same, but for hopeless games the regret captures the hopelessness of the task and measures the performance of the learner relative to an achievable objective. We do not consider this definition here. Readers interested in this variation can consult the papers by Rustichini (1999) ; Mannor and Shimkin (2003) ; Perchet (2011) and Mannor et al. (2014) .
Notation and conventions
The maximum/supremum of the empty set is negative infinity. The standard basis vectors in R d are e 1 , . . . , e d . The column vector of all ones is 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) . The standard inner product is ·, · . The ith coordinate of vector
The interior of a topological space Z is int(Z) and its boundary is ∂Z. The relative entropy between probability measures µ and ν over the same measurable space
where log is the natural logarithm. When X is a random variable with X ∈ [a, b] almost surely, then Pinsker's inequality combined with straightforward inequalities shows that
where µ − ν TV is the total variation distance. When ν µ, the squared Hellinger distance can be written as h(ν, µ) 2 = (1 − dν/dµ) 2 dµ. Given a measure P and jointly distributed random elements X and Y we let P X denote the law of X and (unconventionally) we let P X|Y be the conditional law of X given Y , which satisfies P X|Y (·) = P(X ∈ · | Y ). One can think of P X|Y as a random probability measure over the range of X that depends on Y . In none of our analysis do we rely on exotic spaces where such regular versions do not exist.
With this notation the mutual information between X and Y is I(X
where the limit is taken to the boundary in the interior. The relative entropy between categorical distributions p, q ∈ ∆ k−1 is the Bregman divergence between p and q where F is the unnormalised negentropy:
Probability spaces, policies and environments The Borel σ-algebra on topological space Z is B(Z). Recall that X and Σ are assumed to carry a topology, which we will use for ensuring measurability of the regret. More about the choices of these topologies later. We assume the signal function Φ(a, ·) is B(X )/B(Σ)-measurable and the loss function L(a, ·) is B(X )-measurable. A policy is a function π : ∪ n t=1 ([k] × Σ) t−1 → ∆ k−1 and the space of all policies is Π. A policy is measurable if h t−1 → π(h t−1 ) is B(([k] × Σ) t )-measurable for all h t−1 = a 1 , σ 1 , . . . , a t−1 , σ t−1 , which coincides with the usual definition of a probability kernel. The space of all measurable policies is Π M . In general Π M is a strict subset of Π. For most of the paper we work in the Bayesian framework where there is a prior probability measure ν on (X n , B(X n )). Given a prior ν and a measurable policy π ∈ Π M , random elements X ∈ X n and A ∈ [k] n are defined on common probability space (Ω, F, P). We let Φ t (a) = Φ(a, X t ) and L t (a) = L(a, X t ). Expectations E are with respect to P.
and P t (·) = P(· | F t ). Note that F 1 = {∅, Ω} is the trivial σ algebra. The σ-algebra F and the measure P are such that 1. The law of the adversaries choices satisfies P(X ∈ · ) = ν(·).
For any t ∈ [n]
, the law of the actions almost surely satisfies
The existence of a probability space satisfying these properties is guaranteed by Ionescu-Tulcea (Kallenberg, 2002, Theorem 6.17 ). The last condition captures the important assumption that, conditioned on the observed history, A t is sampled independently from X. In particular, it implies that X t and A t are independent under P t . The optimal action is A * = arg min a∈[k] n t=1 L t (a). It is not hard to see that the Bayesian regret is well defined and satisfies
To minimise clutter, when the policy π and prior ν are clear from the context, we abbreviate BR n (π, ν) to BR n .
Minimax theorem
Our first main result is a theorem that connects the minimax regret to the worst-case Bayesian regret over all finitely supported priors. The regret R n (π, x) is well defined for any x and any policy π ∈ Π, but the Bayesian regret depends on measurability of x → R n (π, x). If ν is supported on a finite set x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ X n , however, we can write
which does not rely on measurability. By considering finitely supported priors we free ourselves from any concern that x → R n (π, x) might not be measurable. This also means that if Σ (or X ) came with some topologies, we simply replace them with the discrete topology (which makes all maps continuous and measurable, implying Π = Π M ).
Theorem 1 Let Q be the space of all finitely supported probability measures on X n . Then inf π∈Π sup x∈X n R n (π, x) = sup ν∈Q min π∈Π BR n (π, ν) .
An equivalent statement of this theorem is that if X and Σ carry the discrete topology then R * n = BR * n (Q), which is the form we prove in Appendix D. The strength of this result is that it depends on no assumptions except that the action set is finite.
Our proof borrows techniques from a related result by Bubeck et al. (2015) . The main idea is to replace the policy space Π with a simpler space of 'mixtures' over deterministic policies, which is related to Kuhn's celebrated result on the equivalence of behavioral and mixed strategies (Kuhn, 1953) . We then establish that this space is compact and use Sion's theorem to exchange the minimum and maximum. While we borrowed the ideas from Bubeck et al. (2015) , our proof relies heavily on the finiteness of the action space, which allowed us to avoid any assumptions on Σ and X , which also necessitated our choice of Q. Neither of the two results imply each other.
Theorem 1 is a minimax theorem for a special kind of multistage zero-sum stochastic partial information game. Minimax theorems for this case are nontrivial because of challenges related to measurability and the use of Sion's theorem. Although there is a rich and sophisticated literature on this topic, we are not aware of any result implying our theorem. Tools include the approach we took using the weak topology (Bernhard, 1992) , or the so-called weak-strong topology (Leao et al., 2000) and reduction to completely observable games and then using dynamic programming (Ghosh et al., 2004 ). An interesting challenge is to extend our result to compact action spaces. One may hope to generalise the proof by Bubeck et al. (2015) , but some important details are missing (for example, the measurable space on which the priors live is undefined, the measurability of the regret is unclear as is the compactness of distributions induced by measurable policies). We believe that the approach of Ghosh et al. (2004) can complete this result.
The regret information tradeoff
Unless otherwise mentioned, all expectations E are with respect to the probability measure over interactions between a fixed policy π ∈ Π M and an environment sampled from a prior ν on (X n , B(X n )). Before our generalisation we present a restatement of the core theorem in the analysis by Russo and Van Roy (2016) . Let I t (X; Y ) be the mutual information between X and Y under P t . Although the proof is identical, the setup here is different because the prior ν is arbitrary.
Theorem 2 (Russo and Van Roy (2016) 
This elegant result provides a bound on the regret in terms of the information gain about the optimal arm. Our generalisation replaces the information gain with an expected Bregman divergence. Let P * ta = P t (A * = a), which is the posterior probability that A * = a based on the information available at the start of round t.
almost surely for all t. Then BR n ≤ αn + nβ diam F (∆ k−1 ).
where the inequality follows from Fatou's lemma. The second equality follows from the tower rule, E t [P * t+1 ] = P * t . The last equality follows from the convexity of the potential F , implying
where the first inequality follows from the assumption in the theorem, the second by Cauchy-Schwarz. The third by Eq. (3), telescoping and the definition of the diameter.
That Theorem 3 generalises Theorem 2 follows by choosing α = 0 and because when F is the unnormalized negentropy,
Finite-armed bandits
In the bandit setting the learner observes the loss of the action they play, which is modelled by choosing Σ = [0, 1], X = [0, 1] k and Φ(a, x) = L(a, x) = x a . The best known bound in this setting is R * n ≤ √ 8kn, which holds for online mirror descent with an appropriate regularizer (Audibert and Bubeck, 2010; . Combining Theorems 1 and 2 with the calculation in Proposition 3 by Russo and Van Roy (2016) leads to the bound R * n ≤ kn log(k)/2. Here we demonstrate the power of Theorem 3 by proving that R * n ≤ √ 2kn. We use the same potential as Audibert and Bubeck (2010) 
Theorem 4 The minimax regret for k-armed adversarial bandits satisfies R * n ≤ √ 2kn.
Proof Combine Theorems 3 and 1, the bound diam F (∆ k−1 ) ≤ 2 √ k and Lemma 5 below for Thompson sampling, which is the policy that samples A t from P t = P * t .
Lemma 5 For Thompson sampling:
Proof Using the fact that the total variation distance is upper bounded by the Hellinger distance (Tsybakov, 2008, Lemma 2 .3) and the first inequality in Eq. (1),
Eq. (4) is true because the total variation distance is upper bounded by the Hellinger distance. Eq. (5) uses Cauchy-Schwarz and the fact that k a=1 (P * ta ) 1/2 ≤ k 1/2 , which also follows from Cauchy-Schwarz. Eq. (6) follows from Bayes law and because P ta = P * ta by the definition of the algorithm. There is no difficulty with Bayes law here because both X ta and A * live in Polish spaces (Ghosal and van der Vaart, 2017) . Eq. Remark 6 Potentials other than the negentropy have been used in many applications in bandits and online convex optimisation. The log barrier, for example, leads to first order bounds for karmed bandits (Wei and Luo, 2018) . Alternative potentials also appear in the context of adversarial linear bandits (Bubeck et al., , 2018 and follow the perturbed leader (Abernethy et al., 2014) .
Investigating the extent to which these applications transfer to the Bayesian setting is an interesting direction for the future.
Finite partial monitoring games
Recall from 
In the standard analysis of partial monitoring the functions f and g are used to derive importanceweighted estimators of the loss differences, which are used by localalised versions of Exp3. In the following f and g are used more directly. A corollary of the classification theorem is that amongst the class of non-degenerate games with at least two actions, the minimax regret is Θ(n 1/2 ) if and only if the game is locally observable. The neighbourhood of a is Lemma 9 (Lattimore and Szepesvári (2019), Lemma 9) For locally observable non-degenerate games, the functions f and g in Eq. (8) can be chosen so that both f ∞ ≤ d+1 and g ∞ ≤ d+1.
For the remainder of this section we assume the game is non-degenerate and locally observable. A brief discussion of degenerate games is deferred to the discussion. A game is globally observable if the learner can estimate the loss differences between any pair of Pareto actions, possibly by playing other actions. Globally observable games are much more straightforward and are defined and analysed in Appendix C. The main theorem is the following, which improves on previous bounds that all depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, even when k and d are fixed.
Theorem 10 For any locally observable non-degenerate game: R * n ≤ k 3/2 (d + 1) 8n log(k).
Before the proof we provide the algorithm, which seems to be novel among previous algorithms for partial monitoring. Note that Thompson sampling can suffer linear regret in partial monitoring (Appendix E). Let G t = arg min a∈[k] E t [L t (a)] be the greedy action that minimises the 1-step Bayesian expected loss. The idea is to define a directed tree with vertex set [k] and root G t and where all paths lead to G t . A little notation is needed. Define an undirected graph with vertices V t and edges E t by
The following lemma is a consequence of Lemmas 7 and 8 (with the proof in Appendix G).
Lemma 11 The directed graph over vertex set [k] with an edge from a to b if a = G t and b = P(a) is a directed tree with root G t .
Let A t (a) be the set of ancestors of action a in the tree defined in Lemma 11. We adopt the convention that a ∈ A t (a). By the previous lemma, G t ∈ A t (a) for all a. Let D t (a) be the set of descendants of a, which does not include a (Fig. 7) . The depth of an action a in round t is the distance between a and the root G t . We call an action a anomalous in distribution P ∈ ∆ k−1 in round t if P a < max b∈Dt(a) P b . Algorithm 1 defines the 'water transfer' operator W t : ∆ k−1 → ∆ k−1 that corrects this deficiency by transferring mass towards the root of the tree defined in Lemma 11 while ensuring that (a) the loss suffered when playing the according to the transformed distribution does not increase and (b) the distribution is not changed too much. The process is illustrated in Fig. 2 in Appendix F, where you will also find the proof of the next lemma.
Our new algorithm samples A t from P t = W k t P * t . Because of the plumbing and randomisation, the new algorithm is called Mario sampling. The proof of Theorem 10 follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2 and the following lemma.
Lemma 13 For Mario sampling: E t [∆ t ] ≤ (d + 1)k 3/2 8I t (A * ; Φ t (A t ), A t ) a.s.. input: P ∈ ∆ k−1 and tree determined by P t find action a at the greatest depth such that P a < max b∈Dt(a) P b .
if no such action is found, let W t P = P and return.
Algorithm 1: The water transfer operator W t : ∆ k−1 → ∆ k−1 .
Proof We assume an appropriate zero measure set is discarded so that we can omit the qualification 'almost surely' for the rest of the proof. By the first part of Lemma 12,
Notice that
For
The existence of such functions is guaranteed by Lemma 9 and the fact that P t (b) ∈ N (b) and because we assumed the game is non-degenerate, locally observable. The expected loss of a can be decomposed in terms of the sum of differences to the root,
In the same way, 
(Eqs. (10) to (12))
Remark 14 In many games there exists a constant m such that |A t (a)| ≤ m almost surely for all a and t. In this case Part 3 of Lemma 12 improves to P ta ≥ P * ta /m and the application of Cauchy-Schwarz in Lemma 13 can be strengthened. This means the bound in Theorem 10 becomes m(d + 1) 8kn log(k). For the game illustrated in Fig. 7 , m = 5 while k = 7, but more extreme examples are easily constructed.
Discussion and future directions
One of the main benefits of the information-theoretic approach is the simplicity and naturality of the arguments. This is particularly striking in partial monitoring, where previous adversarial analysis is not at all straightforward. Even for the k-armed bandit analysis there is no tuning of learning rates or careful bounding of dual norms. In exchange, our results are existential, though we emphasise that the Bayesian setting is interesting in its own right. We anticipate that Theorem 3 will have many other applications and there is clearly more to understand about this generalisation. Is it a coincidence that the same potential leads to minimax bounds using both online stochastic mirror descent and Thompson sampling? k-armed adversarial bandits The application of Theorem 3 to k-armed adversarial bandits demonstrates the power of this result. Note, the best known lower bound when the number of arms is k = 2 shows that asymptotically lim n→∞ R * n n −1/2 ≥ 0.1876 (Vogel, 1960) . By refining the bound on the diameter in the proof of Theorem 4 to D
Degenerate easy games The restriction to non-degenerate games is mainly for simplicity. The appropriate definition of local observability in the general case is more complicated and the result of Lemma 9 no longer holds. It is possible to construct degenerate games for which the supremum norms of the estimation functions are exponential in the dimension (Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2019, §37.10). Nevertheless, combining our techniques with those in leads to an O( √ n) bound, but with a constant that depends exponentially on d.
Open problems There are numerous interesting directions to explore. Perhaps the first step is to stress test the applicability of Theorem 3. Bandits with graph feedback beyond cops and robbers might be a good place to start (Alon et al., 2015) . Another obvious direction is adversarial linear bandits. As a start, one may ask whether the results by Bubeck et al. (2018) can be replicated (or improved) using Theorem 3.
There are many open problems in partial monitoring, a few of which we now describe. We hope some readers will be inspired to work on them! Adaptivity Perhaps the most interesting problem in partial monitoring is adaptivity to the adversary. There exist games where for 'nice' adversaries the regret should be O(n 1/2 ) while for truly adversarial data the regret is as large as Θ(n 2/3 ). Designing algorithms that adapt to a broad range of adversaries is an interesting challenge. Some work on this topic in the stochastic setting is by Bartók et al. (2012) . A related question is understanding how to use the information-theoretic machinery to provide adaptive bounds.
Constants Our results have eliminated arbitrarily large constants from the analysis of easy nondegenerate games. Still, we do not yet understand how the regret should depend on the structure of L or Φ except in special cases. The result in Remark 14 is a small step in this direction, but there is much to do. The best place to start is probably lower bounds. Currently generic lower bounds for finite partial monitoring focus on the dependence on the horizon. One concrete question is whether or not the minimum supremum norm of the estimation functions that appears in Theorem 18 is a fundamental quantity.
Stochastic analysis of Mario sampling Theorem 2 and Lemma 13 show that for any prior Mario sampling satisfies BR n ≤ k 3/2 (d + 1) 8n log(k). In the stationary stochastic setting we expect that for a suitable prior it should be possible to prove a bound on the frequentist regret of this algorithm. Perhaps the techniques developed by Agrawal and Goyal (2013) or Kaufmann et al. (2012) generalise to this setting.
Constructive minimax optimal policies One way to tackle the problem of constructing a minimax optimal policy is to identify a least favourable prior and Bayesian (near-)optimal policy for which the regret is (nearly) constant. This could be a challenging problem, but seems worth investigating. An even more ambitious approach is to try and develop a constructive variant of Sion's theorem. 
Appendix A. Technical calculation
Lemma 15 Let P ta = P t (A t = a). Then the following hold almost surely: Φt(b) .
where in the second and fourth inequalities we used the independence of A t and X under P t . The second part of the lemma follows from an identical argument.
Appendix B. Cops and robbers
To further demonstrate the flexibility of the approach we consider this special case of bandits with graph feedback. In cops and robbers the learner observes the losses associated with all actions except the played action. Except for constant factors, this problem is no harder than the full information setting where all losses are observed. Cops and robbers is formalised in the partial monitoring framework by choosing Σ = [0, 1] k−1 , X = [0, 1] k , L(a, x) = x a and Φ(a, x) = (x 1 , . . . , x a−1 , x a+1 , . . . , x k ) .
Theorem 16 The minimax regret of cops and robbers satisfies R * n ≤ 2n log(k).
This improves on the result by Alon et al. (2015) that R * n ≤ 5 n log(k). We leave for the future the interesting question of whether or not this method recovers other known results for bandits with graph feedback. Theorem 16 follows immediately from Theorems 2 and 1, and the following lemma.
Lemma 17 Thompson sampling for cops and robbers satisfies
almost surely for all t.
Proof Fix t ∈ [n] and let G t = arg max a P ta . Here, we assume that we have already discarded a suitable set of measure zero, so that we do not need to keep repeating the qualification 'almost surely'. Then, subtracting and adding L t (G t ), expanding the definitions and using that P * t = P t ,
where the first inequality follows from grouping the terms that involve L t (G t ) and those that involve L t (a) and then using Pinsker's inequality (1), while the second follows from Cauchy-Schwarz and the definitions,
The result is completed by bounding each term separately. Using that 1 − P tGt = b =Gt P tb ,
where the first inequality follows from the data processing inequality (for b = G t , L t (G t ) is a deterministic function of Φ t (b)) and the last from Lemma 15. The second term is bounded in almost the same way. Here we use the fact that 1 − P tGt ≤ 1 − P ta for all a ∈ [k]:
(1 − P ta )P ta D P t,Lt(a)|A * =a P t,Lt(a)
Combining the previous displays and rearranging completes the proof. Φ(c, x) ) .
Appendix C. Globally observable partial monitoring games
Let v ∈ R be the smallest positive real such that for all pairs of Pareto optimal actions a and b there exists a function f satisfying the above display with f ∞ ≤ v. Again Thompson sampling does not explore sufficiently often. The most straightforward correction is to simply add a small amount of forced exploration, which was also used in combination with Exp3 in prior analysis of these games . We let
where ties in the arg max that defines P * t are broken by prioritising Pareto optimal actions, which means that P * ta = 0 for all degenerate actions. Using this simple policy results in the following theorem.
Theorem 18 For any globally observable finite partial monitoring game,
The bound has the same order as the prior work, but with slightly improved constants . As usual, the crucial step is to bound the expected 1-step regret in terms of the information gain.
Lemma 19 For the policy playing according to Eq. (13) it holds almost surely that
Proof Let a • be an arbitrary fixed Pareto optimal action and for each Pareto optimal action a let f a :
The next step is to decompose the expected loss in terms of f :
where the inequality follows from the definition of P t and the fact that losses are bounded in [0, 1]. Then, by Pinsker's inequality (1),
where the first inequality follows from Pinsker's inequality (1), the second from Cauchy-Schwarz, the third because 1 ≤ kP tc /γ for all c. The last term follows from Lemma 15.
Proof [Theorem 18] By the previous lemma and Theorem 3,
where we choose γ = n −1/3 (kv) 2/3 (log(k)/2) 1/3 and note that when γ > 1 the claim in the theorem is immediate.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof depends on a little functional analysis. The important point is that the space of policies written as probability measures over deterministic policies is compact and the Bayesian regret is linear and continuous as a function of the measures over policies and priors over environments. Then minimax theorems can be used to exchange the min and sup. Guaranteeing compactness and continuity and avoiding any kind of measurability issues requires careful choice of topologies. For a topological space Z, let P r (Z) be the space of Radon probability measures when Z is equipped with the Borel σ-algebra. The weak* topology on P r (Z) is the coarsest topology such that µ → f dµ is continuous for all bounded continuous functions f : Z → R.
Recall that X is the space of outcomes and Σ is the space of feedbacks and these are arbitrary sets. A deterministic policy can be represented as a function π : ∪ n t=1 Σ t−1 → [k]. By the choice of topology on Σ, these are all continuous, hence, measurable. Let Π D be the space of all such policies. By Tychonoff's theorem, Π D is compact with the product topology, where [k] has the discrete topology. Π D is Hausdorff because the product of Hausdorff spaces is Hausdorff. By Theorem 8.9.3 in the two volume book by Bogachev (2007) , the space P r (Π D ) is weak*-compact. Clearly P r (Π D ) is also convex.
Let Q be the space of finitely supported probability measures on X n , which is a convex subset of P r (X n ) where X n is taken to have the discrete topology. Equip with Q with the weak* topology.
If f = f (µ, ν) with f : P r (Π D ) × Q → R is linear and continuous in both µ and ν individually. Since P r (Π D ) is compact, by Sion's minimax theorem (Sion, 1958) 
We are going to choose f to be the Bayesian regret and argue that Π can be identified with P r (Π D ). First, we need to check some continuity conditions for the regret. Since X n has the discrete topology the map x → R n (π, x) is continuous for fixed π. Now we check that π → R n (π, x), π ∈ Π D , is continuous for fixed x. Let Φ t (a) = Φ(a, x t ) and L t (a) = L(a, x t ), which are both continuous since [k] has the discrete topology. Then let σ t : Π D → Σ and a t : Π D → [k] be defined inductively by a t (π) = π(σ 1 (π), . . . , σ t−1 (π)) and σ t (π) = Φ t (a t (π)) .
Writing the definition of the regret,
The second term is constant and, as we mentioned already, a → L t (a) is continuous. So it remains to check that a t is continuous for each t. This follows by induction. The definition of the product topology means that for any fixed σ 1 , . . . , σ t−1 and b ∈ [k], the set
is open in Π D . Let denote the empty tuple. Then a −1
We confirm that a 2 is continuous and leave the rest to the reader. That a 2 is continuous follows by writing
Hence π → R n (π, x) is continuous and also measurable with respect to the Borel σ-algebra on Π D . Then let f (µ, ν) be given by
where the exchange of integrals is justified by Fubini's theorem, which is applicable because the regret is bounded in [−n, n]. Clearly f is linear in both arguments. We now claim that both µ → f (µ, ν) and ν → f (µ, ν) are continuous. To see that ν → f (µ, ν) is continuous, note that x → Π D dµ(π)R n (π, x) is a X n → [−n, n] continuous map owning to the choice of the discrete topology on X n . Since Q ⊂ P r (X n ) is equipped with the weak*-topology, this implies the continuity of ν → f (µ, ν). The argument for the continuity of µ → f (µ, ν) is similar: In particular, first note that π → X n dν(x)R n (π, x) is a Π D → [−n, n] continuous map, since owning to the choice of D, the integral with respect to ν is a finite sum, and we have already established that for x ∈ X n fixed, π → R n (π, x) is a Π D → [−n, n] continuous map. Again, the choice of the weak*-topology on P r (Π D ) implies the desired continuity. The final step is to note that for each policy µ ∈ P r (Π D ) there exists a policy π ∈ Π such that for all x ∈ X n ,
In particular, it is not hard to show that π can be defined through π (a 1 , φ(a 1 , x) , . . . , a t , φ(a t , x)) a = P µ,x (A t+1 = a|A 1 = a 1 , . . . , A t = a t ), where P µ,x is the distribution resulting from using µ on the environment x. Here, the right-hand side is well defined because there are finitely many actions. That π is well defined and is suitable follows from the definitions. Putting things together,
where in (a) we used the fact that the Dirac measures are in Q, (b) follows from Sion's theorem. In (c) we used the fact that the Dirac measures in P r (Π D ) are minimisers of f (·, ν) for any ν, while in (d) we used that Π D ⊂ Π and, via a dynamic programming argument, that the deterministic policies from Π D minimise the Bayesian regret. That BR * n (Q) ≤ R * n follows from
where the last equality used that Π D = Π M , while the second equality used that for any fixed π ∈ Π, ν → Π D R n (π, π D )dν(π D ) is a linear functional on Π D , which is thus maximized in the extreme points of Π D , which are all the Dirac measures over X n . Combining Eqs. (14) and (15) gives the desired result.
Appendix E. Failure of Thompson sampling for partial monitoring
The following example with k = 3 and d = 2 illustrates the failure of Thompson sampling for locally observable non-degenerate partial monitoring games. The game is a toy 'spam filtering' problem where the learner can either classify an email as spam/not spam or pay a small cost for the true label. The functions Φ and L are represented by the tables below, with the learner choosing the rows and adversary the columns. The learner only elicits meaningful feedback in the spam game by paying a cost of c to observe the true label. For appropriately chosen c and prior, we will see that Thompson sampling never chooses the revealing action, cannot learn, and hence suffers linear regret. Let c > 0 and ν be the mixture of two Dirac's: ν = 1 2 δ n SPAM + 1 2 δ n NOT SPAM , where δ n i is the Dirac measure on (i, i, . . . , i). With these choices the optimal action is almost surely either SPAM or NOT SPAM. Since choosing these actions does not reveal any information, the posterior is equal to the prior and Thompson sampling plays these two actions uniformly at random. Clearly this leads to linear regret relative to the optimal policy that plays the exploratory action once to identify the adversary and plays optimally for the remainder. Since this result holds for any strictly positive cost, it also shows that Thompson sampling does not work for globally observable games.
The mugs correspond to actions and are connected at the bottom with valves that default to being closed. The total volume of water sums to 1. Arrows correspond to edges in the tree. The dark arrows indicate which valves are open in each iteration and show the direction of flow. In the first application of W t , mug c is anomalous and the water in mugs b and c is averaged. Imagine opening the valve connecting b and c. The water in a is too low to be included in the average. In the second application, the water in mugs b, c, d and e is averaged. Further applications of W t have no effect because there are no anomalous actions.
Remark 20 Another way to think about the application of W t to P is as follows. First the anomalous action a is identified, if it exists. Then water flows continuously into a from the set of descendants of b that contain more water than a until a is no longer anomalous.
Proof [Lemma 12] To begin, notice that every application of the water transfer operator reduces the number of anomalous actions by at least one because: (1) If a is selected by Algorithm 1 then a is not anomalous in W t P and (2) only actions that were anomalous in P can be anomalous in W t P . Since there are at most k anomalous actions in any P , the water transfer operator ceases to have any affect after more than k operations. Hence Q a ≥ max b∈Dt(a) Q b for all a and the second part follows. For the first part we show that the loss of W t P is always smaller than P . Let
and a ∈ [k] be the anomalous action in P selected by the algorithm. Then let C = {b ∈ [k] : (W t P ) b = P b } be the set of actions for which the distribution is changed. By the definition of the tree,L(b) ≥L(a) for any b ∈ C,
which shows that W t decreases the expected loss. For the last part, notice that during each iteration of the water transfer operator the update occurs by averaging the contents of a number of mugs so that all have the same level (Fig. 2) . Once a group of mugs have been averaged together, subsequently they are always averaged together. It follows that after every iteration the actions [k] can be partitioned so that the level in each partition is the average of P a . Suppose that a is in partition : v ∈ C a } be the set of actions that are optimal at v ∈ ∆ d−1 . It is easy to see that if a * (v) = {a, b} for some v ∈ ∆ d−1 , then a and b are neighbours. Let N = {v ∈ ∆ d−1 : |a * (v)| > 2}, which by the assumption that there are no duplicate/degenerate actions has dimension at most d − 3 and hence H d−2 (N ) = 0. Let a, b ∈ V be distinct and v, w ∈ B ε (u) be such that B δ (v) ⊂ C a and B δ (w) ⊂ C b for some δ > 0, which by definition means that the interval [v, w] ∩ C c = ∅ for all c / ∈ V . Let A be the affine space containing v with normal v − w and P = {arg min x∈A x − y 2 : y ∈ N } be the projection of N onto A. Since projection onto a plane cannot increase the Hausdorff measure, H d−2 (P ) = 0. On the other hand, the fact that A ∩ B δ (v) has dimension d − 2 means that H d−2 (A ∩ B δ (v)) > 0. Therefore H d−2 (B δ (v) ∩ (A \ P )) > 0 and hence there exists an x ∈ B δ (v) ∩ A and y = x + w − v ∈ B δ (w) such that [x, y] ∩ N = ∅. Then the set ∪ z∈[x,y] a * (u) forms a connected path in V between a and b. Proof [Lemma 11] By definition there are no edges starting from G t . By Lemma 7, for all a / ∈ V t there is a neighbour b ∈ N a with strictly smaller loss, E t [L t (b)] < E t [L t (a)]. Hence the definition of P t (a) ensures there are no cycles and that every path starting from a / ∈ V t eventually leads to V t . Then by Lemma 7 the graph (V t , E t ) is connected, which means that for a ∈ V t the parent P t (a) is a vertex b ∈ V t that is closest to G t . Hence all paths lead to G t . The following figure shows the cell decomposition for the above game, ∆ d−1 is parameterised by (p, q, 1 − p − q). In this game all actions a Pareto optimal. All actions are neighbours of MATH and otherwise CLIMB and SKI are neighbours and MATH and RAINDANCE. The game is locally observable because the loss of all actions can be identified by playing that action, except for MATH, the losses of which can be identified by playing any of its neighbours. Tree construction The figure depicts the cell decomposition for a partial monitoring game with seven actions and the tree structure defined in Lemma 11. Arrows indicate the parent relationship. All paths leading towards G t . Red nodes are descendants of a. Blue nodes are ancestors. Dotted lines indicate connections in the neighbourhood graph that are not part of the tree. 
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